After İmamoğlu’s Imprisonment: Eight Scenarios for Turkey’s Political and Economic Future

Introduction

Ekrem İmamoğlu’s imprisonment has set in motion a turbulent process whose outcome is uncertain. Where will this lead Turkey? Framing the question as a multiple-choice test, we might offer two broad answers: (A) This process will trigger change and ultimately unseat the current government, or (B) it will end with the incumbent power even more firmly consolidated.

We can still discuss several possible scenarios for Turkey. The first objective factor that will shape the trajectory of İmamoğlu’s jailing is the social meaning the public assigns to this event. Judges, historians, and scholars will have their opinions, but ultimately the social significance of a political incident is determined by the people. History bears this out – consider the 367 quorum ruling crisis of 2007 or the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes in 1961. In similar fashion, we must wait to see how society interprets the İmamoğlu affair in the long run.

One important caveat: the immediate public reaction can be misleading. If a poll were conducted this week, probably about 60% of Turks would consider İmamoğlu’s arrest a political move. However, what truly matters is the long-term perception. How will people view this event six months or a year from now? Time is a critical factor. A tragic hotel fire that killed dozens might be forgotten in time, whereas initial euphoria for a coup leader in 1980 eventually gave way to public criticism. Even the state itself is capable of reversing its stance – famously, someone once denounced as a “terrorist ringleader” can later be treated as part of a “founding will” of a new order.

How the public ultimately codifies the İmamoğlu verdict in its collective memory is crucial. We are looking at roughly a three-year window, since one way or another Turkey will head to an election within about three years. In that period, the İmamoğlu case might fade into oblivion or transform into a powerful legend. Three years is not a short time – yet, on the other hand, it may not be long if events keep unfolding in ways that continually remind people of İmamoğlu. With these considerations in mind, let us examine eight potential political and economic scenarios that could emerge in the wake of İmamoğlu’s imprisonment.

1. Opposition’s Search for a New Presidential Candidate

İmamoğlu’s jailing poses an immediate question for Turkey’s opposition: Who will be the presidential candidate to challenge President Erdoğan next? Before his imprisonment, İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, was widely seen as a leading contender. If his legal troubles bar him from running, the opposition must rally around an alternative. This scenario forces the opposition, particularly the main Republican People’s Party (CHP), to confront a delicate recalibration of its strategy.

One obvious name is Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara, who like İmamoğlu enjoys broad voter appeal. Yavaş’s firm leadership in the capital and his reputation for competence make him a viable contender, especially as he could attract nationalist-leaning voters beyond the CHP’s base. However, Yavaş has thus far remained non-committal and even indicated he might not seek the nomination without party consensus.

The imprisonment of İmamoğlu could also unify the opposition’s disparate factions out of a sense of injustice. We have already seen members of different opposition parties joining protests and demonstrations calling for İmamoğlu’s release. This solidarity might translate into a consensus candidate if the various opposition leaders agree that ousting the current regime takes priority over individual ambitions. Conversely, without İmamoğlu as a unifying figure, old rifts could resurface making agreement on a single candidate more challenging.

Finally, there is the wildcard scenario: İmamoğlu’s own role from behind bars. If his trial process drags on without a final conviction, technically he could still run a campaign from prison, turning into a Turkish cause célèbre akin to Nelson Mandela or Aung San Suu Kyi. Such a campaign – “İmamoğlu in jail, democracy on the ballot” – would be unprecedented in Turkey. It could galvanize public sympathy and protest votes, but it would also entail great uncertainty and legal complexity. In summary, the opposition’s path to the presidency is fraught with questions. The choice of candidate in a post-İmamoğlu landscape will be a decisive factor in whether the opposition can maintain momentum or loses its footing.

2. President Erdoğan’s Electoral Calculations

From President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s perspective, İmamoğlu’s removal from the scene may offer short-term relief by sidelining a rival, but it also necessitates a recalculation of election strategy. Erdoğan now faces a strategic choice of timing: Should he push for early elections or hold out until the scheduled vote? Each option carries potential benefits and risks for the ruling bloc.

One scenario is that Erdoğan could call an early election, capitalizing on the current disarray in the opposition. With İmamoğlu entangled in legal troubles and the CHP sorting out its leadership and candidate issues, an election moved up to 2026 could catch the opposition flat-footed. An early vote – if timed before economic conditions worsen further – might allow Erdoğan to renew his mandate under more favorable conditions. Calling snap elections could also exploit any sympathy bump or rally-around-the-flag effect among ruling party supporters who view the crackdown on İmamoğlu as a justified move against “corruption” or “terror” (as the government alleges). Moreover, a fresh presidential election called by parliament might reset Erdoğan’s term limit, allowing him to bypass constitutional restrictions and run for another term he otherwise could be ineligible for.

On the other hand, delaying the election until 2028 (the normal schedule) might be Erdoğan’s preferred strategy if he believes time is on his side. This would give his government a chance to address the economic turmoil (discussed further below) and implement policies to win back voters. A later election date also gives the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its nationalist allies time to wear down the opposition. Prolonged legal battles against opposition figures, relentless negative media campaigns, and the possible fracturing of the anti-Erdoğan coalition could weaken any challenger by 2028. Erdoğan could bank on fatigue and fear, presenting himself as the only stable option amid chaos.

However, waiting comes with its own risks. Economic indicators are troubling and public discontent could grow, making a future election harder for the incumbents to win fairly. Additionally, if İmamoğlu’s plight turns him into a martyr in the eyes of the public, resentment against Erdoğan’s government could accumulate over time. Erdogan must also consider the element of surprise: in 2023, the opposition was unprepared for some of his maneuvers, but by 2026 or 2027 they might better organize, especially if they anticipate an early poll.

Another facet of Erdoğan’s strategy involves dividing and deterring his opponents. We can expect the ruling camp to continue exploiting fissures within the opposition or even covertly backing alternative opposition candidates to split the anti-Erdoğan vote. At the same time, Erdoğan will strive to keep his own conservative base tightly mobilized. By framing İmamoğlu’s case as a matter of national security or law and order, he can rally loyalists who see the opposition as aligned with undesirable elements.

In essence, Erdoğan’s election strategy post-İmamoğlu is likely to be a two-pronged approach: strike the opposition at its weak points while shoring up his base through patronage and polarizing rhetoric. Whether he opts for an early electoral showdown or a war of attrition until 2028 will depend on how he reads the evolving landscape – and on his confidence in managing the other volatile factors at play in Turkey.

3. Constitutional Gambit and Kurdish Negotiations

The imprisonment of Ekrem İmamoğlu has impacted not only the main opposition but also a broader equation that includes the Kurdish political movement. The Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), which is effectively the successor to the HDP, plays a key role in parliamentary balances. In recent months, it was reported that, under DEM’s initiative, meetings were held with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island, followed by the DEM delegation holding discussions with both the ruling AKP and the opposition CHP. These developments sparked speculation in the public about a possible constitutional bargain. The fact that Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli referred to Öcalan for the first time in years and welcomed the DEM delegation warmly suggested that the government might be taking significant steps to win Kurdish votes.

There are indications about what might have been on the negotiation table. In October 2024, DEM Party lawmakers submitted a draft law proposing the conditional release of prisoners who have served 25 years of their sentence—including Öcalan. The proposal aims to provide conditional parole after a certain number of years under the aggravated life sentence regime that replaced the death penalty—Öcalan has already served over 25 years.

Observers argue that the government has become more open to DEM Party’s demands as part of its goals to resolve the terrorism issue and pursue a new constitution. Longstanding Kurdish demands—such as education in the mother tongue and strengthening local administrations—are believed to be part of the bargaining process.

However, İmamoğlu’s imprisonment appears to have shifted the course of this fragile process—or even brought it to a halt. DEM Party co-chairs Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan strongly condemned İmamoğlu’s jailing, calling it “a blow to justice and democracy.”

The Kurdish political movement has equated the seizure of democratic will in Istanbul with the long-standing practice of appointing state trustees to municipalities in the Kurdish-majority southeast, emphasizing the need for a joint struggle. These reactions suggest that the DEM Party’s grassroots may now be more reluctant toward any potential reconciliation with the government. Meanwhile, certain factions within the ruling bloc have reacted critically to suggestions that the AKP might be seeking a deal with Öcalan.

The atmosphere of mistrust created by the İmamoğlu incident may have complicated or derailed constitutional negotiations. If the government is seeking reconciliation with the Kurdish movement on one hand while imprisoning the most prominent opposition mayor on the other, it becomes increasingly difficult for DEM Party leaders to justify the process to their base. In short, İmamoğlu’s imprisonment has complicated the government’s strategy of playing the Kurdish card and pushed the constitutional reform process into uncertainty.

4. Uncertain Future of the Presidential System

Turkey’s executive presidential system, introduced in 2018, faces an uncertain future amid the current turmoil. İmamoğlu’s imprisonment and the authoritarian drift it symbolizes have intensified debates over whether the centralized presidential model should continue or be reformed. In this scenario, the question is whether Turkey will stay the course with Erdoğan’s “Turkish-style” presidency or pivot back toward a strengthened parliamentary system (as the opposition has advocated).

For the opposition and many analysts, the recent crises underscore the flaws of one-man rule. The presidential system, which concentrates vast power in the hands of the president, is seen as enabling the kind of political repression exemplified by İmamoğlu’s arrest. Checks and balances have weakened, the judiciary’s independence is doubted, parliament’s role is diminished. Critics argue that as long as the current system persists, any election can quickly become a winner-takes-all battle for survival – raising the stakes dangerously high and encouraging undemocratic tactics. The six-party opposition alliance that contested Erdoğan in 2023 had even signed a detailed pledge to restore parliamentary democracy, appoint an impartial judiciary, and reduce the powers of the presidency.

Should the opposition come to power in the next election, one of their first orders of business would likely be to implement these pledges, replacing the presidential system with a more pluralistic governance model. Thus, one scenario is a post-Erdoğan Turkey where the presidential system is dismantled in favor of a return to a prime minister at the helm, answerable to an empowered parliament, and a largely ceremonial or impartial president.

However, the future of the system is not solely contingent on an opposition victory. Internal dynamics within the ruling camp could also bring change. It’s noteworthy that even some figures within Erdoğan’s circle and allied parties have, at times, expressed discomfort with the hyper-centralization of decision-making. If political and economic pressures mount (say, if Erdoğan’s popularity sinks further or if allies fear he cannot win another term under the current setup), there could be a push for a controlled transition: perhaps keeping Erdoğan at the top but diluting the presidency’s powers to appease critics and allies. For example, there has been talk in AKP circles of creating a powerful vice-presidential post or reintroducing the role of a prime minister to share the burden. Such adjustments could be presented as “reforms” to ensure stability, without completely relinquishing the executive presidency.

Another possibility is that Erdoğan himself, calculating the longevity of his legacy, might initiate a systemic change if he believes it would secure his position or protect his interests in a potential retirement. Although this seems unlikely given his investment in the current system, Turkish politics has seen sudden reversals before. Erdoğan could attempt a statesmanlike move to convene a broad constitutional convention (perhaps tied to the Kurdish negotiations mentioned above) that overhauls the system with input from all sides. This could theoretically defuse some opposition fervor by addressing the core issue – the concentration of power – while allowing Erdoğan to claim credit for a democratic opening.

In any event, the presidential system’s legitimacy will be tested in the upcoming period. The next election, in effect, will be a referendum on that system. If Erdoğan wins again under it, the model survives (albeit likely with continued controversy). If he loses, the opposition is poised to bury it. And if instability grows, even Erdoğan’s camp might tweak it. Turkey stands at a crossroads where the structural framework of its governance is up for negotiation – something that seemed unthinkable a few years ago when the new system was touted as the solution to all ills. Now, with those ills multiplying, the future of the presidential regime is truly in play.

5. Acceleration of State Islamization

Under the strain of political conflict and declining public support, one scenario is that Turkey’s government intensifies the Islamization of the state as a strategy to rally its core base and redefine the national agenda. President Erdoğan’s AKP has Islamist roots, and throughout its two-decade rule, it has incrementally increased the role of religion in public life – from expanding Imam-Hatip religious schools and empowering the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), to enacting symbolic measures like lifting the headscarf ban and converting Hagia Sophia back into a mosque. Now, facing perhaps the greatest challenge to its rule, the regime could double down on this Islamization drive.

What might an accelerated Islamization look like? We could see more overtly religious rhetoric and policy initiatives emanating from Ankara. The government might introduce new legislation emphasizing religious values – for instance, stricter regulations on alcohol, mixed education, or content deemed “un-Islamic” in the media and arts. There could be a push to infuse Islamic law principles into civil law, or at least a louder discourse about morality and family values aimed at the conservative segments of society. The education system is a likely arena: curricula might further shift to highlight Ottoman-Islamic heritage, and the number of religious schools and Quran courses could rise with additional state funding. The Diyanet, which is already a massively funded state institution, may assume an even more central role in daily governance, issuing pronouncements that align with the ruling party’s line on social and even economic matters (for example, endorsing economic views by invoking religious justifications for low interest rates, as has happened in the past).

Such measures would serve a few purposes for the ruling coalition. First, they can galvanize the Islamist conservative base by framing the moment as an existential battle for Turkey’s soul – “us (pious patriots) vs. them (secular elitists and infidels).” If successful, this narrative might solidify support among religious communities, some of whom have been wavering due to economic hardships. Second, an emphasis on Islamic identity can distract from material troubles: rather than debate inflation or corruption, public discourse shifts to culture wars over how women dress, what books are appropriate, or whether prayers are adequately observed. It’s a classic rally-round-the-flag tactic, with religion as the flag. Third, increased Islamization could be used to justify and entrench authoritarian moves. For instance, dissenters and protesters (including those angry about İmamoğlu’s jailing) might be painted not just as political opponents, but as enemies of faith or instigators against a divinely ordained order. By casting the political struggle in quasi-religious terms, the government might legitimize harsher crackdowns.

However, this scenario comes with significant dangers. Turkey is a deeply diverse society – not only secular vs. religious, but also home to millions of Alevis (a minority Muslim sect often wary of Sunni political Islam) and non-Muslim communities. Aggressive Islamization policies could exacerbate societal cleavages and alienate large segments of the population. Urban, secular, and younger Turks – many of whom already bristle at what they see as the government’s intrusions on personal liberties – could be driven into even more active opposition. We might see intensified culture clashes on university campuses, in the arts (with artists protesting censorship), and in everyday life.

Furthermore, overt Islamization might hurt Turkey’s international standing and its struggling economy – foreign investors and Western allies could see it as a sign of further instability or a turn toward theocracy, reducing confidence in the country.

In summary, while leaning harder into political Islam might seem a natural refuge for Erdoğan’s government under pressure, it is a high-risk, high-reward strategy. It could reinvigorate a portion of the electorate and redefine the narrative away from opposition criticisms, but it could just as easily deepen Turkey’s divisions and push the country toward a more perilous domestic conflict over the role of religion in the state. The coming period will reveal whether Erdoğan chooses to invoke the populist Islamist playbook more forcefully, and how Turkish society responds if he does.

6. The Question of Election Fairness

Looming over all political scenarios is a fundamental concern: Will the next elections be free and fair? The imprisonment of a major opposition figure like İmamoğlu, on what many believe are spurious charges, has already cast doubt on the fairness of the political playing field. Looking ahead, one scenario is that the government further skews the electoral process in its favor – raising the question of whether Turkey’s elections will remain meaningfully democratic or descend into pseudo-elections typical of authoritarian regimes.

Several warning signs are already present. In recent years, Erdoğan’s government has tightened its control over media (with the vast majority of TV channels and newspapers either state-owned or owned by pro-government businessmen), and it has not hesitated to use state institutions to hobble opponents.

The Supreme Election Council (YSK), which oversees voting, has made controversial decisions in the past – for example, annulling the initial 2019 Istanbul mayoral vote that İmamoğlu won. It is not far-fetched to imagine even bolder moves if the ruling bloc’s hold on power is threatened. One dire scenario is pre-election suppression: more opposition politicians could face legal persecution, party organizations might be harassed, and critical NGOs (especially those focused on election monitoring) could be targeted or shut down. If key opposition voices are silenced or resources drained by constant court cases, the playing field going into an election would be heavily tilted.

On election day itself, the integrity of the vote could come into question. Allegations of ballot stuffing or digital tampering – things that Turkey has largely avoided in past elections – might surface if desperation within the ruling camp grows. Even subtler manipulation could occur: relocating ballot boxes from opposition strongholds under security pretexts, pressuring public employees and security forces to vote en masse for the government, or using the state of emergency powers (if invoked in certain provinces) to curtail campaigning by rivals. The atmosphere could be marred by intimidation – imagine armed police or militias unofficially linked to the government patrolling polling stations in critical districts, deterring opposition voters.

Perhaps the most decisive moment will be the post-vote period and the transfer of power if the opposition wins. A truly fair election would mean little if the results are not honored. There is a scenario, whispered in opposition circles, of a Turkey where Erdoğan refuses to concede despite an electoral loss. In such a case, he might cite fraud (ironically in reverse) or security issues, possibly using courts to invalidate results in enough districts to swing the outcome. Alternatively, the parliament (dominated by Erdoğan’s allies) could stall or complicate the transition by questioning the legitimacy of the winner. This is an extreme scenario – and it would put Turkey into uncharted and dangerous territory – but it cannot be completely discounted given how high the stakes are for Erdoğan, who would fear not only loss of power but potential legal consequences thereafter.

The flip side is that Turkey has, until now, managed to hold generally credible elections even under Erdoğan’s dominant rule. The mere presence of these concerns has mobilized civil society and the opposition to prepare robust election monitoring mechanisms. In response to fears of fraud, opposition parties are training tens of thousands of volunteers to guard ballot boxes, report irregularities, and ensure parallel vote counts. Awareness is high, and international observers would likely scrutinize the next election closely. Therefore, another possible outcome is that despite all the unfair hurdles, the election process holds – possibly with a narrow, contested result that nonetheless reflects the voters’ will.

In essence, the fairness of the coming elections is itself a major unknown scenario. If the process is significantly compromised, it could spell the end of Turkey’s democratic experiment in anything but name. If it remains intact, it could provide an avenue for peaceful change. For Turkey’s future, much hinges on whether those in power choose to respect the rules of the game or to manipulate them to stay in control.

7. Mounting Economic Crisis and Pressures

Turkey’s economy forms the backdrop of all these political maneuvers, and it constitutes a scenario in its own right: a worsening economic crisis could dramatically alter the country’s political trajectory. Even before İmamoğlu’s arrest, the Turkish economy was under severe stress. The political instability stemming from the İmamoğlu affair has only added to investor jitters and public anxiety. In late March, for instance, as news of the Istanbul mayor’s detention spread, Turkey’s Central Bank reportedly burned through billions of dollars of reserves in a bid to prop up the lira, which was sliding in value. Such signals indicate an economy on edge, highly sensitive to political risk.

One scenario is that the economic downturn accelerates, creating a feedback loop that undermines the government’s capacity to govern. If inflation, currently in double digits, spirals higher, ordinary citizens will feel the pain acutely in their daily expenses – food, fuel, rent, everything. Turkey’s working and middle classes have already seen a significant erosion of purchasing power over the recent years. A point may come where even the government’s base – traditionally more tolerant of economic difficulties so long as cultural and religious priorities were met – begin to lose patience as their livelihoods are hurt. Unemployment, especially among the youth, remains high, and a recession or further currency crisis could push joblessness to politically destabilizing levels.

Even a less apocalyptic economic decline has major political ramifications. The government pursued unorthodox economic policies – notably, Erdoğan’s personal insistence on low interest rates despite high inflation – which have deterred foreign investment and drained reserves.

It’s also worth noting that the economic crisis intersects with all other scenarios. For example, if Erdoğan attempts the Kurdish deal or other bold moves, a relatively stable economy would give him confidence, a collapsing economy would make those moves feel like last-minute gambits. Similarly, election fairness might become moot if the economy implodes – the clamor for change would be overwhelming. The public’s tolerance for political drama diminishes when accompanied by empty wallets and job losses. Social tensions (the next scenario) are frequently inflamed by economic grievances at their root.

In conclusion, Turkey’s economy is the giant variable that could trump all political calculations. A sustained crisis would likely erode the government’s support and could even lead to splits within the ruling elite, as different factions seek scapegoats for the economic mess. It could also strengthen the opposition’s hand, as even those who were skeptical of them might vote for change out of sheer economic desperation. Conversely, if by some mix of prudent policy shifts or external factors (like a drop in global energy prices or influx of Gulf funds) the economy stabilizes, Erdoğan might regain enough public confidence to navigate the turmoil. In essence, economic fate and political fate are tightly intertwined in Turkey’s near future.

8. Rising Social Tensions and Potential Unrest

The final scenario to consider is an escalation of social tensions to a boiling point, leading to widespread unrest or even violent confrontations. Turkey has a history of mass protests and social upheavals – from the Gezi Park demonstrations of 2013, which saw millions rally against Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies, to various waves of labor strikes, to the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast. The imprisonment of İmamoğlu, coupled with the other stresses we’ve discussed (political repression, economic pain, cultural polarization), could serve as a spark in a tinderbox.

In the immediate aftermath of İmamoğlu’s detention, Istanbul and other cities saw impromptu protests. Notably, these occurred despite a lack of formal call from the CHP leadership – indicating genuine grassroots anger. Many Turks perceive İmamoğlu not just as a politician, but as the embodiment of their democratic vote in Istanbul that is being stolen. If court decisions continue to be viewed as politically driven and unjust, public trust in legal and electoral remedies will erode. People may feel they have nowhere to vent their frustration except the streets.

The government’s response to protests will be crucial. Under a scenario of rising unrest, a harsh crackdown is almost certain. Turkish police and security forces have become adept at dispersing demonstrations with tear gas, water cannons, and mass detentions – we saw this during Gezi Park and more recently in the suppression of protests over various issues. If protests over İmamoğlu’s jailing or related grievances gain momentum, the state may declare local states of emergency or use anti-terror laws to arrest organizers. This, however, could simply raise the temperature further, leading to running street battles or pitched standoffs like those in 2013. There is also the ominous possibility of pro-government vigilantes or counter-mobs emerging.

Ethnic and regional tensions compound the picture. The Kurdish issue remains a fault line. If talks between Erdoğan and the Kurdish movement collapse (or are perceived as insincere), Kurdish-populated areas in the southeast could see renewed protests or even riots, especially if DEM Party politicians are harassed or removed from office as has happened in the past. Likewise, the presence of millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey is another potential flashpoint. In times of economic hardship and political uncertainty, refugees often become scapegoats, and there have already been local incidents of violence against Syrians. A breakdown in social order could see these incidents multiply, adding a dangerous xenophobic element to the unrest.

Finally, one cannot rule out a scenario where social turmoil prompts the intervention of forces outside the normal political arena. In Turkey’s past, periods of chaos and street violence have sometimes been a prelude to military coups (as in 1980). Today’s Turkey is different. The military’s political power has been curbed and it is closely controlled by Erdoğan. Yet, a completely desperate situation might raise whispers of extralegal solutions among some factions. Even absent a coup, prolonged unrest would deeply damage the fabric of Turkish society and could lead to regional or class-based schisms that take years to heal.

In sum, rising social tensions are a very real and worrying scenario. If Turkey’s leaders and institutions fail to manage the crises outlined in the previous scenarios, the anger of the populace could boil over. The result might be something Turkey has managed to avoid for some time: sustained internal conflict at the street level, presenting a stark choice between chaotic upheaval or hardline authoritarian clampdown. Preventing this outcome will require compromise, restraint, and wisdom which are in short supply in Turkey’s current political climate.

Conclusion

The imprisonment of Ekrem İmamoğlu has unleashed a cascade of political and societal dynamics in Turkey. We have explored eight potential scenarios – from the opposition’s recalibration and Erdoğan’s strategic gambits, to constitutional negotiations with the Kurds, the fate of the presidential system, a turn toward Islamization, the integrity of elections, economic turbulence, and the prospect of unrest. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. In reality, elements of several may emerge in combination. Turkey stands at a crossroads where decisions made in the coming months will shape its democracy, society, and economy for years to come.

Will the opposition unite and overcome, or flounder without its brightest star? Will Erdoğan reinvent his approach to cling to power, or overreach and hasten his downfall? Can a new social contract be forged to address the Kurdish issue and reform the system, or will old patterns of conflict prevail? How much more Islamist and authoritarian might the state become, and can the electorate even freely choose an alternative path? And underlying all of this, will bread-and-butter issues force a reckoning that politics alone cannot manage?

As Turkey navigates this turbulent period, one lesson from history is worth reiterating: the true meaning of political events is decided over time, not in the heat of the moment. İmamoğlu’s imprisonment may, in hindsight, be seen as the catalyst for democratic regeneration or as the linchpin in a descent into deeper authoritarianism. The outcome will depend on the interplay of the scenarios we have outlined. In the face of uncertainty, all stakeholders in Turkey (political leaders, institutions, and citizens alike) carry a heavy responsibility to steer the country away from the most dangerous outcomes and towards a stable and just future. The coming three years will test Turkey’s resilience and define its direction on the world stage.